How My Own Robot Reviewer Caught My Secret Sitting in `ps aux`
If you pass secrets to a subprocess as command-line arguments, every other process on the box can read them with ps aux. Pass them via stdin inste
Auth, access control and the holes found along the way.
If you pass secrets to a subprocess as command-line arguments, every other process on the box can read them with ps aux. Pass them via stdin inste
PostgREST's .not('column', 'in', '(1,2,3)') builds a raw filter string — you own the sanitization. One .map(Number).filter() call per call site
If your open-redirect guard is a string heuristic, it's probably bypassable. Use new URL() and compare origins instead. One-liner → five lines. Bu
'unsafe-eval' in your script-src doesn't weaken your CSP — it effectively disables it. It had been sitting there since I first wired up the secu
An app-layer auth gate doesn't protect you when the auto-generated REST API accepts any valid Google JWT. Lock the OAuth door first, then gate the UI.
Storing a resource ID in the browser is not ownership. Bind every object to a secret token and verify it server-side — or anyone who guesses the ID can
If your Next.js server action does redirect(userInput) — even for something as innocent as a post-login bounce — you have an open redirect. The fix is
In Next.js, protecting a page does NOT protect the server actions behind it. Every action is its own callable endpoint. Guard each one with require
Your frontend can be bypassed in 30 seconds with curl. Validate everything server-side — IDs, tokens, route params — as if the client doesn't exis